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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in admitting evidence obtained 
in violation of state and federal constitutional provisions? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in upholding the trial 
court's ruling? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants were charged with several criminal counts of 
commercial bribery, antitrust boycott and racketeering. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On January 26, 1983, Judge Boyd Bunnell of the 7th District 
authorized the Attorney General's office to conduct a criminal 
investigation pursuant to the Subpoena Powers Act. Based almost 
entirely on evidence discovered during the course of the 
investigation, criminal charges were filed against Appellants and 
other co-Defendants in 3rd District. Appellants were tried in 
1985. Prior to trial the Appellants were granted a severance 
from the trial of co-defendant L. Brent Fletcher. Appellants 
moved to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to the secret 
investigation conducted by the Attorney General. The motion was 
denied. The Appellants were found guilty on counts charging 
bribery, anti-trust and racketeering violations. Appellant 
Michael Thompson was sentenced to serve not less than one nor 
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. Appellant 
Bruce Conklin was sentenced to serve one year in the Salt Lake 
County Jail on work release. Each was fined $25,000 for the 
antitrust violations. Based on the racketeering convictions the 
Court also ordered forfeiture of all business interests of Appel-
lants in their security guard companies. 
During trial, Appellants moved for mistrial on the basis 
that the prosecution had improperly elicited from two witnesses 
the fact that co-defendant Fletcher had previously been tried on 
the same charges and on the further basis that a juror had 
discovered the fact that Fletcher was convicted. These motions 
were denied. Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal on September 
13, 1985. (R.439) 
Petitioners1 sentences were stayed pending appeal. (R.478) 
The appeal was originally filed in this Court but was 
subsequently transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals and heard 
there. Two members of the Utah Court of Appeals panel voted to 
affirm the convictions. Judge Gregory K. Orme dissented as to 
the group boycott antitrust convictions. State v. Thompson, 751 
P.2d 805 (Utah App. 1988)1 Appellants Thompson and Conklin 
petitioned the Court for a Rehearing. The Petition was denied 
April 8, 1988. Appellants filed a petition for certiorari which 
was granted July 7, 1988. 
This case was inadvertently given the heading State v. 
Fletcher in the Pacific Reporter advance sheets. The trial of 
Mr. Fletcher was severed from that of Appellants. Each appealed 
separately. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pursuant to the Utah Subpoena Powers Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
77-22-1 through 77-22-3, the Attorney General instigated a secret 
investigation centered on alleged misconduct in the handling of 
Utah Power & Light's security contracts. Subpoenas were issued 
by the Attorney General's office without prior judicial review or 
approval. In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 638 (Utah 
2 1988) The subpoenas stated that they were authorized by Order 
of the District Court and that disobedience was punishable by 
contempt. (See Appendix, Page 1) None of the subpoenas 
described the nature or scope of the investigation, nor were the 
recipients informed as to the general subject matter of the 
investigation. In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 638. 
Persons receiving the subpoenas were instructed by the Attorney 
General that a secrecy provision of the Act prohibited them from 
speaking to anyone other than their attorney concerning the 
proceedings. (Id.) Pursuant to information discovered during 
the investigation, criminal charges were brought against 
Appellants in April of 1984. Id. 
The investigation continued in the same manner following the 
filing of criminal charges. JA. In May of 1984, officers and 
Due to the secret nature of the investigation, very little 
information on the investigation itself is contained in the court 
file; therefore, many of the facts surrounding the conduct of the 
investigation are drawn from the Court's opinion in In re Crimi-
nal Investigation. 
employees of Utah Power & Light filed a Motion to Quash Subpoenas 
issued in aid of the criminal investigation. Utah Power & Light 
argued that the Subpoena Powers Act was unconstitutional on its 
face and as applied. In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 
639. 
Judge Bunnell ruled on their motions May 30, 1984, holding 
the Act constitutional provided that the prosecutors (i) inform 
subpoenaed witnesses whether they were targets of the 
investigation, (ii) inform targets of the nature and scope of 
the matter under investigation, and (iii) conduct the 
investigation within the parameters of the good cause affidavit. 
Id. 
In August, Emery Mining moved to quash an investigative 
subpoena sent by the Attorney General as part of the ongoing 
investigation. Judge Bunnell granted the Motion to Quash and 
various motions to reconsider his earlier ruling on the constitu-
tionality of the statute. Id. On reconsideration, Judge Bunnell 
held that the act was vague and violated the rights of due 
process and the right against self-incrimination. (Appendix, 
Pages 3 through 7) In terminating authority for the inves-
tigation, the Court cited the following as examples of the abuses 
which had occurred. Subpoenas sent to an accounting firm 
demanded "all books, records and papers of any kind relating to 
Mike Thompson and Associates . . . Mike Thompson, individually, 
Bruce Conklin, individually, . . . and all other individuals 
and/or entities associated therewith.ff Judge Bunnell also cited 
as abuse the fact that the deposition of Brent Fletcher, who was 
named as a co-defendant along with Thompson and Conklin, was 
taken in violation of the safeguards imposed by the Court. 
(Appendix, Page 5) 
Following Judge Bunnell's ruling, Appellants brought a 
motion before Judge Billings, the trial judge, to suppress the 
evidence obtained in violation of their constitutional rights in 
the criminal investigation. That matter was heard December 27, 
1984. (Supplemental Record pages 1-29) On January 10, 1985, 
Judge Billings, by Memorandum Decision, denied Appellants' Motion 
and ruled that: (1) Judge Bunnell's ruling that the statute was 
unconstitutional constituted the "law of the case," (2) that the 
proper standard for determining whether the evidence must be 
suppressed was Utah Code Annotated § 77-35-12(g)j and (3) 
Defendants failed to carry their burden of proving both a) that 
the State's conduct resulted in a substantial violation of their 
constitutional rights, and b) that the acts of the State were not 
committed in good faith reliance on what it assumed was a 
constitutional statute. (Appendix, Pages 8-14) 
The case proceeded to trial in July of 1985. (R.686) 
Appellants were convicted. (R. 448-460) Appeal was taken and 
briefs filed with the Utah Supreme Court; however, in trans-
ferring cases to the newly created Court of Appeals, this case 
was sent down to the lower court. The trial judge, Judge 
Billings, was by then a judge on the Court of Appeals. 
In December of 1987, the Utah Supreme Court, in State v. 
Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987), held that Utah Code Annotated 
§ 77-35-12(g) impermissibly shifted the burden of proving a sub-
stantial violation of constitutional rights and lack of good 
faith on the part of the police officers to the Defendants and 
was therefore unconstitutional. This ruling invalidated both the 
statute and the reasoning upon which Judge Billings based her 
ruling in this case. 
The Court of Appeals, recognizing that the basis for Judge 
Billing's ruling had been invalidated by Mendoza, substituted the 
federal "Good Faith" exemption to the exclusionary rule created 
in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Applying a 
recently created extension to that doctrine which was enunciated 
in Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed. 2d, 
364 (1987), the Court of Appeals stated: 
This Court may affirm a trial court's 
decision to admit evidence on any proper 
ground, even though the trial court assigned 
another reason for its ruling. Regardless of 
the decision of the Utah Supreme Court on the 
constitutionality of the Utah Mini-Grand Jury 
Act, we hold the evidence obtained pursuant 
to the subpoenas duces tecum was admissible 
under the principles set forth in Krull. The 
trial court's denial of defendants' motion to 
suppress is affirmed. 
State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 810 (Utah App. 1988) (citations 
omitted). 
Just three weeks after the Court of Appeals issued its 
opinion in the instant case, this Court released its opinion in 
In re Criminal Investigation, wherein this Court agreed that the 
Subpoena Powers Act had been applied in an unconstitutional 
manner in this case, but upheld the constitutionality of the 
Subpoena Powers Act by construing it to contain limitations in 
addition to those initially imposed by Judge Bunnell. In re 
Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 636. 
Appellants1 Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the evidence 
obtained through the unconstitutional investigation should have 
been suppressed at trial. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The grounds and reasoning supporting the Trial Court's 
admission of the evidence gathered in the investigation have been 
soundly rejected by this Court. The Court of Appeals' basis for 
affirming the trial court's ruling is not applicable to our fact 
situation, since there was no "good faith reliance" on the 
statute and since the purpose of the exclusionary rule will be 
served by exclusion of the evidence in this case. Article I, 
Section 26 of the Utah Constitution prohibits application of the 
reasoning relied on by the Court of Appeals to violations of 
state constitutional law. The reasoning of the federal case 
relied on by the Court of Appeals should be rejected to preserve 
the independence and integrity of State constitutional rights. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED IN 
VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS 
The evidenced gathered by the Attorney General under the 
Subpoena Powers Act violated Appellants1 rights to be free of 
unreasonable searches as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution; their rights under the Fifth Amendment and Article 
I § 12 of the Utah Constitution to avoid self incrimination and 
their rights of due process and equal protection, as guaranteed 
by the 14th Amendment and by Article I § 24 of the Utah 
Constitution, 
A. Search and Seizure, 
In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Court 
first stated the principle that evidence seized in violation of 
Defendants1 Fourth Amendment rights is inadmissible. That case, 
decided prior to the adoption of the Utah Constitution in 1896, 
invalidated a statute which authorized the court, upon motion by 
the prosecutor, to require the Defendant to produce in court his 
private books, invoices and papers. The statute in question 
allowed the prosecutor to make an allegation and then, if "in his 
belief any business, books, invoices or papers belonging to or 
under the control of, the defendant or claimant, will tend to 
prove any allegation made . . . may, at its discretion, issue 
notice to the defendant or claimant to produce such books, 
invoices, or papers in Court, . . ." Boyd, 116 U.S. at 620. The 
Supreme Court, after an eloquent recitation of the historical 
antecedents of the Fourth Amendment, stated: "any compulsory 
discovery by extorting the parties oath, or compelling the 
production of his private books and papers, to convict him of a 
crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the principles 
of a free government.11 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 631-32. 
The Court held that the statute violated both Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment rights stating 
these two Amendments throw great light on 
each other. For the "unreasonable searches 
and seizures11 condemned in the Fourth Amend-
ment are almost always made for the purpose 
of compelling a man in a criminal case to be 
a witness against himself". 
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633. 
In the instant case, the Attorney General issued subpoenas for 
the "books, papers, records", of Appellants. These were issued 
to Appellants1 bankers, accountants and business associates, 
compelling production of the documents by order of the court. 
Failure to comply was punishable by contempt. This Court, in In 
re Criminal Investigation, held that these actions "denied rights 
guaranteed by the act and by the Fourth Amendment. U.S. 
Constitution Amendment IV." 754 P.2d at 659. 
These actions also denied Appellants the protections 
guaranteed by Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Since that provision must provide at least as much protection as 
the Fourth Amendment, a Fourth Amendment Violation is by 
necessity a violation of Article I, Section 14; therefore no 
additional analysis regarding the scope of the protection offered 
under the State Constitution is necessary when a federal 
violation has been established. See Industrial Commin. v. 
Wasatch Metal, 594 P.2d 894 (Utah 1979). 
In In re Criminal Investigation, this Court held that 
without the warnings and notice requirements inherent in the act 
that the opportunity for pre-compliance challenge of the subpoe-
nas was stifled and that such warnings were necessary to protect 
Defendants' rights. It is undisputed that such warnings were not 
given in the instant case. The failure to give these warnings 
violated Appellants1 rights. 
The Court construed the secrecy provision of the Subpoena 
Powers Act to require disclosure of the good cause affidavit. In 
re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 656. Also, the Court 
concluded that all investigations must be fully documented and 
that such documentation be maintained by the district court 
authorizing the investigation. In re Criminal Investigation, 754 
P.2d at 653. Without this documentation the district court would 
have no way to adequately supervise the investigation. Without 
access to the good cause Affidavit, individuals receiving 
subpoenas would have no way to determine whether the information 
sought came within the scope of the affidavit. See, In re 
Criminal Investigation, 754 at 654. In the instant case, this 
Court found that the secrecy provisions of the Act were applied 
too broadly. This flaw, and the failure to fully document the 
investigation, prejudiced Appellants by preventing any meaningful 
pre-compliance challenge of the subpoenas until the investigation 
was nearly complete. When the subpoenas were challenged, the 
challenges were upheld. Had the warnings and notices been given 
in this case as the Court has required, Defendants could have 
challenged the issuance of the subpoenas at a time when the 
challenge would have afforded adequate protection of their 
rights. 
The manner in which the investigation was carried out in the 
instant case violated Defendants1 rights under the Fourth 
Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Therefore, all evidence seized as a result of the investigation 
must be suppressed. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); 
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987). 
B. Self-incrimination. 
As noted by the Court in Boyd, the rights guaranteed by the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments are often very closely related. In 
analyzing the constitutionality of the Subpoena Powers Act, this 
Court held that in order to protect the rights against 
self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, and more 
particularly by Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, 
that ffthe state's attorney must notify every witness prior to 
interrogation (i) of the general subject matter of the inves-
tigation, (ii) of the existence and nature of the privilege 
against self-incrimination, (iii) that the information provided 
may be used against the witness in a subsequent criminal proceed-
ing, and (iv) of the right to have counsel present. In re 
Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 648. Only the final warning 
regarding the right to counsel was afforded the witnesses in the 
instant case. Had these warnings been given as is now required, 
the witnesses may have refused to answer certain questions or 
may, under the protection of Article I Section 12, may have been 
able to exercise their right to remain silent. See, In re 
Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 660, (Stewart, Justice, 
dissenting.) 
Article I, Section 12 imposes another requirement that 
special warnings be given to the targets of the investigations to 
apprise them of their rights. The target warnings required by 
the Act were not given in this case. The deposition of Brent 
Fletcher was taken without informing him that he was a target of 
the investigation. (Appendix, P.5). The targets of the 
investigation were never apprised of their status or given an 
opportunity to assert the rights guaranteed by Article I, Section 
12. 
Without the Constitutional safeguards required by this 
Court, the Subpoena Powers Act violates the self-incrimination 
provisions of both the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
Since the evidence gathered as a result of the investigation in 
the instant case was done so in violation of these rights, the 
information thus gathered is inadmissible and Appellants1 motion 
to suppress should have been granted. 
C. Due Process. 
The unique circumstances of this case have had the effect of 
denying Appellants due process of law guaranteed under the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. The investigation 
was authorized by the 7th District Court which bore 
responsibility for its supervision. Under that authority Judge 
Bunnell terminated the investigation because of violations of 
constitutional rights of the subjects of this investigation 
(Appendix, Page 6). However, since the criminal actions spawned 
by the investigation were filed in Third District Court, Judge 
Bunnell lacked jurisdiction to rule on the admissibility of the 
evidence gathered. 
This reveals one problem with the Subpoena Powers Act not 
addressed by the Court in In re Criminal Investigation. The 
considerable power of the court to supervise the investigation, 
and thus insure the protection of individual rights, is inef-
fective if, as here, the supervising court does not have power to 
rule on the admissibility of evidence. This problem was serious-
ly compounded in the instant case by the failure to make an 
adequate record of the investigation. The minimum requirements 
for documentation outlined in In re Criminal Investigation, 754 
P.2d at 653, were not met in this case. Appellants were forced 
to argue this case before a judge who was unfamiliar with the 
details of the investigation and they were improperly saddled 
with the burden of proving both a "substantial violation" of 
fundamental rights and "lack of good faith" on the part of the 
investigating officer. See State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 
1987). Furthermore, they were forced to carry this burden on the 
basis of a record which was constitutionally inadequate and which 
had been improperly withheld from them. 
The procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights contain 
limitations on the exercise of the government's power over its 
citizens which are so fundamental to a fair and ordered system of 
justice that the absence of one or another of these particular 
guarantees denies a suspect or a defendant due process of law. 
See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
In conducting the investigation in violation of the safe-
guards imposed by Judge Bunnell, and without the procedures 
imposed on the Subpoena Powers Act by this Court, the State 
committed wholesale violations of fundamental rights in gathering 
the evidence used against Appellants in this case. The notion of 
"due process of law" contained in the 5th and 14th Amendments and 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution requires more than 
an after-the-fact acknowledgement that additional safeguards 
should be required. "When state action impinges on fundamental 
rights, due process requires standards which clearly define the 
scope of permissible conduct so as to avoid unwarranted intrusion 
on those rights." In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981). This 
Court has acknowledged that the investigation conducted impinged 
on fundamental rights. The application of the Subpoena Powers 
Act to Appellants was a denial of due process, if not because the 
standards were unclear, because the standards simply were not 
applied. 
The fact that the Act can, if certain guidelines are fol-
lowed, be applied in a constitutional manner does not change the 
fact that the Act, as applied in the instant case did not ade-
quately protect the rights of the witnesses or the targets of the 
investigation. By conducting the investigation in a manner which 
impeded judicial supervision and was inconsistent with funda-
mental constitutional principals, the state denied Appellants1 
rights to due process of law as guaranteed by the State and 
Federal Constitutions. 
D. Equal Protection/Uniform Operation of Laws. 
As demonstrated both by Respondents in In re Criminal 
Investigation, and by Appellants in this case, the Subpoena 
Powers Act was applied unconstitutionaly in this instance. Due 
to the procedural requirements imposed by this Court, the 
Subpoena Powers Act can no longer lawfully be applied in the same 
manner as it was applied in the instant case. 
The Utah Constitution Article I, Section 24 provides "all 
laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.11 Although 
this provision may differ in both language and scope from the 
Federal provision, it embodies the same general principle as the 
14th Amendment. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 888-89 (Utah 1988). That principle, simply 
stated is that the law cannot be applied one way to one person 
and another way to someone similarly situated. 
Any person who is targeted for an investigation conducted 
under the Subpoena Powers Act must be afforded the safeguards 
imposed by the Court. To require less would violate the rights 
of the subjects of the investigations. Appellants are guaranteed 
by the Constitution uniform operation of the law. They seek only 
to be afforded protection equal to that which the Constitution 
requires be given any subject of an investigation under the Act. 
If the Subpoena Powers Act requires full documentation of 
the investigation, or adequate warnings to persons subpoenaed, or 
notice to targets of the investigation in order to be applied in 
a constitutional manner, then Appellants need be afforded these 
rights. The failure to offer Appellants the required 
constitutional safeguards denies the protection afforded every 
other citizen who comes under the jurisdiction of the Subpoena 
Powers Act. Allowing evidence gathered in violation of the 
Court's construction of the Act is prohibited by the 
constitutional guarantees of equal protection and "uniform 
operation" of law. 
II. 
THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
TAINTED ALL OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Appellants assert that all of the evidence sought to be 
suppressed was gathered in direct violation of their rights under 
the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Sections 7, 12, 14, 24, 25, 26, and 
27 of the Utah Constitution. However, any evidence gathered 
during the course of the investigation which was not a direct 
result of violations of Appellants1 constitutional rights was the 
direct result of violations of the constitutional rights of each 
person subpoenaed. See In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 
633. All information gathered in the investigation is therefore 
tainted and must be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree11. 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); U.S. v. 
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Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 275 (1978); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 
Utah 1981). 
In Wong Sun, the police burst into a Chinese laundry looking 
for drugs. The initial search was not based on probable cause 
and uncovered no evidence. However, the subject of the search, 
intimidated by the police conduct, gave information which allowed 
the investigation to broaden and eventually resulted in the 
seizure of a small amount of heroin and an arrest and conviction. 
Even though the illegal search in Wong Sun did not directly 
violate the rights of the defendant, evidence seized because of 
information gathered in the illegal search was suppressed as 
being "fruits of the poisonous tree.11 
The facts of this case are analagous. The investigation was 
conducted in a fashion that violated the Constitutional rights of 
the persons receiving the subpoenas. See In re Criminal 
Investigations, 754 P. 2d 633. Each person subpoenaed and each 
document uncovered by the subpoenas added a piece to the puzzle 
in the prosecution's very complicated case and also added a link 
to the paper chain of evidence that was presented to the jury. 
The policy underlying the rule against the use of evidence 
obtained by unconstitutional means cannot be circumvented simply 
because the illegal search uncovered evidence indirectly instead 
of directly. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). 
Without the evidence obtained in violation of the rights of each 
person answering a subpoena issued under the special inves-
tigation, the prosecution would not have been able to put togeth-
er the long, complex scenario of allegations which form the basis 
of the charges against Appellants. Therefore, all evidence, 
whether gathered in direct violation of Appellants1 rights, or 
the rights of others, or whether indirectly resulting from 
information so gathered, is tainted by the unconstitutional acts 
and therefore must be excluded as "fruits of the poisonous tree.11 
See Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 120 (1942); see 
State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 52 (Utah 1982); State v. Northrup, 756 
P.2d 1288, 1295 (Utah App. 1988). 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING TAINTED EVIDENCE. 
Judge Billings1 ruling admitting the evidence was based on 
the statutory good faith exception contained in Utah Code Ann. § 
77-35-12(g). This Court, in State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 
1987), held that statute unconstitutional. One of the fatal 
flaws in § 77-35-12(g) was that it shifted the burden to the 
defendant to "prove the equivalent of police conduct made in bad 
faith before the Court can apply the exclusionary rule." Iji. at 
186. Another basis for striking down the statute was that it 
required a threshold requirement of a "substantial violation11 of 
Defendant's rights that went beyond what was required by United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
This, the flawed portion of the statute, formed the basis of 
the trial court's reasoning in admitting the evidence. At trial, 
the State argued: "Now, if Defendants are to succeed in this 
motion it is their burden to show the lack of good faith and to 
show substantial violations of constitutional rights. . .If 
(Supplemental Record, Pages 25 and 26). In denying the Motion to 
Suppress, the trial court stated: 
[D]efendantsf Motion to Suppress is denied as 
they have not shown: (1) that the State1 s 
conduct in its use of the !fSubpoena Powers 
Act" in the case resulted in a substantial 
violation of Defendants1 constitutional 
rights, and (2) that the acts of the State 
were not committed in good faith reliance on 
what it assumed was a constitutional criminal 
statute. 
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Clearly, the trial court placed the burden of proof on the 
Defendants. In State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d at 186, this Court 
states: 
Pursuant to Mapp, if the defendant estab-
lishes a fourth amendment violation, the 
illegally-seized evidence must be suppressed 
regardless of the egregiousness of, or the 
intentions motivating, the police officers' 
conduct. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655, 81 S. Ct. at 
1891. Because Leon is an exception to the 
application of the exclusionary rule, the 
State must prove the necessary elements of 
the "good faith" exception. 
Nowhere in the transcript of the suppression hearing is there any 
evidence which would support a finding that the State carried its 
burden of showing "good faith" reliance. 
The trial court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to 
the Appellants and held them to a standard whose threshold was 
higher than that allowed under the Federal Constitution. Under 
the proper standard of review the state is required to prove the 
application of the good faith exception. Since both the grounds 
and the reasoning supporting the trial court's decision have been 
struck down by this Court, its ruling denying Appellants1 Motion 
to Suppress should be reversed. 
IV. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
The Court of Appeals, recognizing that the basis for the 
trial court's ruling was no longer sound, stated it could uphold 
the trial court's decision to admit evidence if there were a 
proper basis to do so. State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 810 
(Utah App. 1988). The Court of Appeals' basis for admissibility 
was the principle set forth in Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 
(1987). In that case, a police officer conducted a warrantless 
administrative inspection of an auto salvage yard pursuant to 
statutory authority. The day following the search, the statute 
was held unconstitutional. The trial court granted the 
Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized in the search. 
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the argument that 
the officer had relied on the statute in good faith See People v. 
Krull, 107 111 2d 107, 481 N.E.2d 703, 708 (1985). The United 
States Supreme Court reversed and said that since the officer's 
actions were authorized by statute that no deterrent effect would 
be served by exclusion of the evidence. Illinois v. Krull, 480 
U.S. , 96 L.Ed. 2d 375. (Hereinafter cited as Krull). 
The Court of Appeals' reliance on Krull is misplaced. 
First, Krull's reasoning is not applicable to our factual 
situation, second, even if Krull is applied, there was no "good 
faith reliance" on the statute, third, Krull's result is 
impermissible under the Utah Constitution, and finally, the 
rationale of Krull should not be applied to violations of 
Appellants' state constitutional rights. These arguments will be 
addressed separately. 
A. The Exclusionary Rule Exception Found in Illinois v. 
Krull is Not applicable to our Factual Situation. 
Krull relies on Leon's characterization of the purpose of 
the exclusionary rule as being simply to deter misconduct on the 
part of the state. The majority reasons that "unless a statute 
is clearly unconstitutional, an officer cannot be expected to 
question the judgment of the legislature that passed the law," 
therefore suppressing the evidence seized by a officer acting in 
objective reliance on a statute would have little deterrent 
effect. Krull, 480 U.S. , 94 L.Ed. 2d at 375. 
Unlike Krull, application of the exclusionary rule in this 
case will have a deterrent effect. In upholding the constitu-
tionality of the Subpoena Powers Act, this Court imposed guide-
lines designed to protect constitutional rights, however, as the 
Court recognized, the Act still vests considerable discretion in 
the investigating authority and may still be subject to abuse. 
Application of the exclusionary rule in this case is necessary 
and will have a deterrent effect in future cases. Unless there 
is a penalty imposed on the abuse of the considerable powers 
granted under the Act, there is nothing to restrain the inves-
tigating authority from pressing the limits imposed by this Court 
beyond constitutional boundaries. 
Where the statute is declared unconstitutional as in Krull, 
no further reliance can be made on it and there is no danger of 
the same type of violations reoccurring. However, under the 
unique facts of the instant case, the statute remains in force; 
thus the risk of future violations of the same type or nature 
remain. Discretion still lies with the investigating authority; 
therefore, some deterrent for the abuse of that discretion must 
remain to ensure that individual liberties are adequately pro-
tected. The rationale of Krull, that no deterrent effect would 
be served by exclusion of the evidence, is simply not applicable 
to the facts before the Court. 
B. There was no "Good Faith Reliance11 on the Language of 
the Statute. 
Krull, in paraphrasing Leon's rational for admitting il-
legally obtained evidence states: 
Penalizing the officer for the [legisla-
ture's] error, rather than his own, cannot 
logically contribute to the deterrence of 
Fourth Amendment violations. 
Krull, 94 L.Ed 2d at 375 (citations omitted). 
Here, the error cannot be laid at the legislature's feet. 
Had the legislature erred in drafting the statute, so that an 
objective reading of the Subpoena Powers Act allowed acts in 
violation of constitutional principles, the Act, by definition, 
would be facially unconstitutional. See Nowak, Constitutional 
Law, p. 600 (1983). This Court, in In re Criminal Investigation, 
held the Subpoena Powers Act to be constitutional on its face. 
754 P.2d at 658. Therefore, any error in the application of the 
statute is the error of the person responsible for interpreting 
and enforcing the act; in this instance, the Attorney General. 
The situation is analagous to a police officer making a stop 
for "probable cause.11 The officer has authority to stop someone 
provided he has "probable cause" to do so. What constitutes 
probable cause is difficult to determine, yet, an officer may 
have to make that decision several times a day without time for 
deliberation or research into the latest court opinion. If the 
officer is wrong in his subjective judgment regarding probable 
cause, the evidence seized as a result of the stop and any 
subsequent search must be suppressed. See State v. Mendoza, 748 
P.2d 181, (Utah 1987). 
Here, the Attorney General was authorized to "conduct a 
criminal investigation." Although the Subpoena Powers Act may 
not have been as precise and complete as it could have been in 
outlining how this was to be done, it contained much more 
specific guidelines than are available to an officer making a 
decision to stop for "probable cause." Like the officer, the 
Attorney General must be familiar with prior court rulings on 
search and seizure. He must be aware that "all witnesses must be 
able to claim the privilege against self-incrimination." See 
State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 222-23, 429 P.2d 969, 973 
(1967); see also In re Criminal Investigation, 754 at 646. He 
must be aware that some type of warning is required to make the 
exercise of that privilege meaningful. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 444, 469 (1966); see also In re Criminal Investigation, 754 
Po2d at 22. He must know that adequate records of the 
investigation be kept to allow for meaningful judicial 
supervision. See In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 653. 
In short, the Attorney General, in applying not only the Subpoena 
Powers Act, but any statute he is empowered to enforce, must know 
the constitutional limitations imposed on the statute by rulings 
of the Court, and by the language of the constitution. 
The Attorney General's task in that respect is no more 
difficult than that of the rookie patrol officer who must make a 
determination of probable cause. However, the Attorney General's 
education, training and experience give him a greater knowledge 
of the law. He has tremendous resources at his disposal, includ-
ing up-to-the-minute access to the latest court opinions on any 
subject. He is not forced to make his decision on how the 
investigation is to be conducted at the spur of the moment or 
with his life at peril. Appellants ask merely that the Attorney 
General in this case be held to the same standard as any police 
officer. In making a subjective judgment on whether his actions 
meet constitutional requirements, there should be no difference 
between the officer's judgment regarding probable cause and the 
Attorney General's interpretation of a facially valid statute. 
When the Attorney General is wrong in determing when his actions 
infringe on the constitutional rights of a citizen he should not 
be allowed to avoid the suppression of the evidence wrongly 
seized as a result of his misjudgment. 
In this case, due to the validity of the statute, not only 
was there no reliance on the statutory language as in Krull, but 
the violations of the specific restrictions approved by Judge 
Bunnell obliterated any claim that such reliance could have been 
made in "good faith." Judge Bunnell, concerned with the way the 
investigation was proceeding, outlined certain specific 
constitutional requirements and stated that he would give the Act 
the presumption of constitutionality so long as it was conducted 
within that framework. On reconsideration Judge Bunnell 
observed: 
Since that ruling, the court has had oppor-
tunity to see the manner in which the act has 
been applied and is being applied and the way 
it can be used to violate the personal rights 
of the citizens of this state. . . . the act 
has been abused and is subject to continued 
abuse. . . . 
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As untenable as any claim of "good faith reliance11 may have 
been prior to the issuance of the guidelines by the district 
court, any vestige of such reliance was obliterated once Judge 
Bunnell gave specific direction as to how the investigation was 
to be conducted. From that point, no violation of Appellants1 
rights could have been made-in "good faith." 
The Court of Appeals relied on Krull without any analysis of 
the facts of this case. After outlining the principle stated by 
Krull the Court of Appeals simply stated: "Likewise, in the 
instant case, subpoenas duces tecum were executed in objective 
reasonable reliance on prior, external authorization." State v. 
Thompson, 751 A.2d at 809-10. 
A police officer acting on a valid warrant has "prior 
external authorization," but only to act within constitutional 
bounds. Even with a valid warrant he cannot violate the suspects 
Fourth Amendment rights by exceeding the limits of the warrant, 
Kremen v. U.S. , 353 U.S* 346 (1957); or his Fifth Amendment 
rights, or right to counsel; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963); nor can he deny the suspects due process of law. All 
government action, whether by prior authorization of statute or 
judicial authority must be conducted within the bounds set by the 
Constitution. The fact that the Subpoena Powers Act allowed the 
issuance of subpoenas in aid of the criminal investigation did 
not nor cannot authorize the manner in which the investigation 
was conducted. 
"Objectively reasonable reliance11 does not follow automat-
ically from the fact that there was "prior external authoriza-
tion. ff In this case there was no objective reliance on the 
statute. The statute as written called for subjective interpre-
tation in application of constitutional principles external to 
the statutory language. Reliance solely on the statutory lan-
guage removed from overriding constitutional principles could not 
be made in good faith especially after specific constitutional 
guidelines were set by Judge Bunnell. These guidelines were 
violated by the State in this case. Appellants1 rights were 
violated as a result. The remedy provided for such constitution-
al violations is suppression of the evidence seized. See State 
v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288. Both the trial court and the Court 
of Appeals erred by failing to afford Appellants this remedy. 
C. The Exclusionary Rule Exception found in Illinois v. 
Krull Cannot Apply to State Constitutional Violations. 
The Court of Appeals1 reliance on Krull is misplaced. Krull 
does not, and cannot, apply to violations of the Utah Constitu-
tion. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution was intended 
to prevent state-authorized intrusion into private citizens1 
papers, records, personal privacy and dignity. See In Interest 
of I., R.L., 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987). The framers of the 
Utah Constitution included the provisions of Article I, Section 
26 to ensure that rights guaranteed by our State Constitution 
could not be infringed by any governmental action. Article 1, 
Section 26 of the Utah Constitution states: "Provisions of this 
Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express 
words they are declared to be otherwise." The Utah Constitution, 
Article I, Section 14 states that "the right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated." The 
language of Article I, Section 14 is clear and unambiguous. 
Article 1, Section 26 prohibits giving any effect to a statute 
passed in violation of Constitutional provisions. The result of 
Illinois v. Krull is to give effect to a statute in derogation of 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Article I, Section 26 
prohibits this result. In Walton v. State Road Commin, 558 P.2d 
609 (Utah 1976), Justice Maughn, in dissent, expressed this view 
regarding the effect of Article I, Section 26 on the rights 
guaranteed by Article I, Section 22, (prohibiting the taking of 
private property without just compensation). He stated: 
This provision is mandatory and prohibitory, 
and I do not believe the legislature can 
attach to it a limitation which in effect 
repeals it. 
Id. at 611. 
Similar views regarding the effect of Article I, Section 26 
have been expressed in Romney v. Barlow, 24 Utah 2d. 226, 469 
P.2d 497 (1972)(Callister, dissenting); Mattheson v. Monson, 588 
P.2d 147, 153 (Utah 1975)(Hall, dissenting); Hume v. Small Claims 
Court of Murray City, 590 P.2d 309 (Utah 1979) (Ellett, 
dissenting). 
The mandatory and prohibitory language of Article 1, Section 
26 prevents the legislature from abrogating, limiting or modify-
ing rights guaranteed by the State Constitution. It embodies the 
principle argued by James Otis in Paxton, Quincy 51 (Mass. 1761), 
that "an act against the Constitution is void.'1 2 Works of John 
Adams, 523-528 (C. Adams, ed. 1850). Article I Section 26 cannot 
simply be ignored. As stated by Chief Justice John Marshall in 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1 Cranch 1803), "It cannot 
be presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be 
without effect . . .." 
The Court of Appeals1 ruling, based on the holding of Krull 
must be reversed. Article I, Section 26 mandates that the pro-
tections granted by the Utah Constitution cannot be abrogated, 
even on a temporary basis, by a legislative enactment. 
D. The Court of Appeals Failed to Recognize State Consti-
tutional Violations as an Independent Basis for Exclu-
sion. 
Irrespective of the prohibition of Article I, Section 26, 
this Court should decline to apply the rationale of Krull to vio-
lations of Appellant's rights under the State Constitution. It 
is well-established that state courts can expand the protection 
offered by their state constitutions beyond the scope of the 
Federal Constitution. See State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 
1981); Valley Bank & Trust v. Rite Way Concrete, 742 P.2d 105 
(Utah App. 1987). 
The instant case is illustrative of the necessity of doing 
so. The reasons for not applying Krull to violations of Article 
I, Section 14 are best articulated by the four dissenting 
Justices in Krull. In Justice 0fConnor's persuasive dissenting 
opinion, she condemns the holding of the majority for providing a 
grace period for legislation during which the state is permitted 
to "violate Constitutional requirements with impunity.ff Krull 94 
L.Ed. 2d at 382, Justice O'Connor states that Statutes 
authorizing unreasonable searches were a central concern of the 
framers of the Fourth Amendment. Iji. at 383. The Fourth 
Amendment is the embodiment of the idea that no legislative act 
can authorize an unreasonable search. The fact that legislators 
fail, on occasion, to adhere to the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment is evidenced by the many statutes held unconstitutional 
on fourth amendment grounds. See Krull, supra, See eg. , Ybarra 
v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979); Sybron v. New York, 392 U.S.40 
(1968); State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987). The fact 
that legislators are subject to polital pressures to "get tough11 
on law breakers gives motivation to invade rather than protect 
Fourth Amendment rights. The exception provided by the Krull 
majority adds the further temptation to promulgate questionable 
laws under which convictions could be obtained by using tainted 
In dealing with the Utah Constitution search and seizure 
provision, Article I, Section 14, the arguments voiced by Justice 
O'Connor are persuasive because they return to the constitutional 
language and the purpose it was designed to serve. In developing 
Krull, the Federal Court relied on an extention to a principle 
stated in an exception to a remedy designed to protect against 
the violation of the constitutional provision. When the princi-
ple becomes this attenuated from the source, it loses its validi-
ty. Article I, Section 27 of the Utah Constitution desires to 
prevent such occurrences. It states: "Frequent recurrence to 
fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual 
rights and the perpetuity of free government.ff By returning to 
the source of the rights granted and the purposes for granting 
them, rather than allowing the right to be obscured by the body 
of law that has grown up around it, results such as Krull cannot 
be reached. 
In Krull, the legislature passed an unconstitutional statue; 
it was applied to an individual who challenged it; it was 
conceded that the application of the statute violated his rights, 
yet he is provided no remedy. Article I, Section 14 should not 
yield such an anomalous result. The purpose behind Section 14 is 
to protect the privacy of the individual against intrusion by the 
state through prohibiting the passage of laws which invade 
individual rights. Where individual rights are violated, the 
individual who prevails in showing that a statute, or the 
application thereof, violated his rights should be vindicated. 
The result reached in Krull has the effect of not only 
encouraging legislatures to violate constitutional rights with 
impunity, it has the more insidious vice of preventing such laws 
from being reviewed by the courts. A person who feels his rights 
have been violated has no motivation under Krull to go through 
the time, expense and bother of an appeal since even if he is 
successful in showing the unconstitutionality of the Statute, he 
himself is afforded no remedy. This impedes the Court's role in 
protecting constitutional rights. 
This Court should not allow individual liberties to be 
compromised in this fashion. By declining to follow Krull in 
extending the exception to the exclusionary rule for violations 
of State Constitutional rights, this Court ensures that the right 
of the people of this state "to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated." Utah Constitution, Article I, 
Section 14. 
CONCLUSION 
Suppression of the evidence, as requested in Appellants1 
pretrial motion is mandated by the facts and circumstances of 
this particular case. Appellants were the targets of an investi-
gation which, by admission of the State, was carried out in an 
unconstitutional manner. The trial court admitted evidence based 
on an unconstitutional statute. The Court of Appeals neverthe-
less affirmed the trial court on a principle of federal law which 
is not applicable to violations of our State Constitution and 
which has no application to the facts of this case. For all of 
these reasons, Appellants respectfully request that the trial 
court's ruling denying their motion to suppress be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this day of December, 1988. 
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CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION : CS NO. 1 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: 
Norman Maxfield 
1407 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
You are hereby commanded to set aside all business 
and excuses and appear at the Office of the Attorney General 
of the State of Utah, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, at the hour of £*?&> Km.. on QJIA , the 
_l2#LT*day of ftpfcP -
 f 1984, to give testimony 
in support of a criminal investigation. You are entitled to 
be represented by legal counsel. 
You are also commanded to bring with you any and 
all books, records, documents, accounts, or papers 
pertaining to Mike Thompson, Mike Ziemski, Bruce Conklin, et 
al., MT\>Vanguard, Great Basin Patrol, and L. Brent 
Fletcher. 
This subpoena duces tecum is authorized by order 
of the District Court. Disobedience to this order is 
punishable by contempt of Court. 
Given under my hand this day of April, 1984. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
PAUL M. WARNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Litigation Division 
STANLEY \H. OLSEN 
Assis£fcxlt Attorney General 
Attorney for State of Utah 
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SEP 2 ! 1934 
BRUCE C. FUNK. 
By. J( . 
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CS NO. 1 
On September 12, 1984, a hearing was held in this 
Court pursuant to Notice on Motions submitted by parties 
who were subject to subpoena under this Criminal Investiga-
tion proceeding. The Court ruled from the bench on most 
Motions and took under advisement the challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Act (77-22-1 et seq.), authorizing 
the investigative procedure being used as raised by several 
of the parties for the first time in their own behalf and by 
other parties on a Motion to reconsider. 
The Court previously considered the constitutional 
challenge to the Act at a hearing held on May 30, 1984, and 
the Court ruled at that time that the Court would give the 
Act the presumption of constitutionality provided that in 
its application the State Prosecutors comply with the follow-
ing requirements: 
1. Witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to the 
Act must be informed whether or not they are 
targets of the investigation; 
Recorded in Judgment Record 
2. Such witnesses must be informed of 
the nature of the matter under investigation 
and the scope of the investigation; 
3. Investigations conducted under the 
authority of the Act must be limited to 
criminal investigations within the parameters 
of the initial good cause affidavit. 
Since that ruling, the Court has had opportunity 
to see the manner in which the Act has been applied and is 
being applied and the way it can be used to violate the 
personal rights of the citizens of this state. 
For instance, the subpoena duces tecum served upon 
Emery Mining Company commands that Company to produce: 
"records which identify all officers, 
directors, consultants and employees 
(both union and non-union, professional 
and mining) of Emery Mining for the period 
1979 to the present. Such shall include, 
but not be limited to, names, addresses , 
telephone numbers, dates of employment 
and employee numbers, if known*M 
Upon challenge, this Court ordered that general 
subpoena suppressed as being too broad in any investigation 
of any criminal activity. 
A previous subpoena issued by the Attorney General's 
Office attempted to get into Utah Power and Light Company's 
dealings in uranium mining, when in fact the#original Good 
Cause Affidavit mentioned no indication of any criminal deal-
ings in this area. The State withdrew this subpoena when 
challenged in this court. 
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Another subpoena issued out of this proceeding 
was directed to a CPA firm and ordered the production of 
the following: 
"You are commanded to bring with you any and all 
books, records, papers of any kind relating to 
Mike Thompson and Associates, Guardex, Alarmex, 
Vanguard, Mike Thompson, individually; Mike Ziemski, 
individually; Bruce Conklin, individually; Patsy 
Bowman, individually; and all other individuals 
and/or entities associated therewith/1 
This subpoena was withdrawn by the State upon challenge in 
this Court. 
The deposition of L. Brent Fletcher,taken pursuant 
to subpoena issued under this investigative proceeding, did 
not comply with the requisites that this Court feels must be 
imposed to make the Act constituional in its application in 
that the witness never was informed that he was a target, 
nor as to the nature of the investigation and, because of 
the Secrecy Order, he had no way of knowing whether the matter 
being inquired into was within the perimeter of the good cause 
showing. He was allowed, and did have, his attorney present 
with him during these proceedings. 
Some criminal charges have already been filed in Salt 
Lake County based upon information obtained through this proceed 
ing, and a civil anti-trust case has been filed in Salt Lake 
County, also as a result of some of the information derived from 
this investigative proceeding. This investigative proceeding is 
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still open and being used for whatever purposes the State 
desires and solely within their discretion under the Act, 
without limitation as to when a criminal investigation 
becomes a prosecution or controlling the ultimate use of 
the findings for civil purposes. 
The Act has been abused and is subject to continued 
abuse under its broad terms and provisions that set no limit-
ations upon the State or any guidelines to the use of their 
subpoena power. The Court quite agrees with the Utah Supreme 
Court in its statement given in the case of In Re The Matter of 
Nelda Boyer, 636 P2d 1085, wherein the Court states as follows: 
"When State action impinges on fundamental rights, 
oue process requires standards which clearly 
define the scope of permissable conduct so as 
to avoid unwarranted intrusion on those rights." 
This Court has, therefore, concluded that the Act 
is too vague and does not give proper protection to individual 
citizens against violation of their constituional right of 
due process and protection against self-incrimination and 
allows for an absolute abuse of power without the benefit of 
judicial review or control once the general subpoena power 
is granted and finds the Act is unconstitutional 
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xxxiv 
THEREFORE, the Court does hereby dismiss this 
Criminal Investigative Proceeding and strikes the Investigative 
Subpoena Power heretofore granted to the State by this Court. 
DATED this ^,/X^day of September, 1984. 
,—^OYD BUNNELL/DISTRICT COURT/' JJZ. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
L. BRENT FLETCHER, MICHAEL C. 
THOMPSON, BRUCE A. CONKLIN, 
and MICHAEL ZIEMSKI, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. CR-84-1115 
The defendants' Motion to Suppress was heard by the Court 
on the 27th day of December, 1984. The State of Utah was represented 
by Stanley Olsen, David Schwendiman and Suzanne Dallimore, Assistant 
Attorney Generals, and the defendants by Harold Christensen, 
Esq., Max Wheeler, Esq., and Sumner J. Hatch, Esq. The Court 
heard oral arguments of counsel after having reviewed the extensive 
Memoranda filed. At this hearing the Court ruled that Judge 
Bunnell's ruling that the "Subpoena Powers Act," Utah Code 
Ann., Section 77-22-1, was unconstitutional was the law of this 
case. However, the Court took under advisement the issue as 
to whether the evidence gathered by the State pursuant to the 
Subpoena Powers Act should be suppressed as a matter of law. 
Defendant claims that the evidence obtained by the State 
through the use of the "Subpoena Powers Act," Utah Code Ann., 
Section 77-22-1, et seq., must be suppresssed. While defendants 
^*y2. 
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acknowledge that no Utah authority exists for this position, 
they cite United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298 
(1978), and United States v. Genser, 595 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(Genser II) , as supportive of suppression. These cases are 
not on point. 
In LaSalle National Bank an Internal Revenue Service agent 
asked the United States District Court to enforce a summons 
issued to the bank under 26 U.S.C. 7602. The district (trial) 
court ruled the summons unenforceable because the agent was 
conducting a criminal investigation and Section 7602 is a civil 
summons power (unlike the Subpoena powers Act in the present 
case which specifically authorizes criminal investigations) . 
The Supreme Court did not address the issue of suppression, 
but instead referred the case to the District Court to determine 
if the summons had been issued to gather evidence for both a 
civil and a criminal prosecution or if it had been issued solely 
to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution. 
Defendants also cite Genser II as authority for the position 
that evidence gathered pursuant to the "Subpoena Powers Act" 
must be suppressed. In Genser II, the Internal Revenue Service 
had issued summonses under Section 7602. Defendants were convicted 
of tax evasion and appealed on the grounds that the summonses 
issued during the investigation exceeded the I.R.S.'s authority. 
The appellate court remanded the case to the district court 
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for an evidentiary hearing on the defendants' contention that 
the I.R.S. had exceeded itfs authority. On remand, the district 
court concluded that the summonses employed during the investigation 
were not issued solely for a criminal purpose as defined in 
LaSalle National Bank. The defendants challenged that ruling 
on the grounds that the district court had misconstrued the 
substantive requirements of LaSalle National Bank. The appellate 
court again remanded the case to the district court on the basis 
that the proper focus under LaSalle National Bank should have 
been on the purpose of the individual summonses not on the purpose 
of the investigation as a whole as the district court had concluded. 
The appellate court stated that: 
If any one of those summonses were issued 
solely for a criminal purpose, the fruits 
of that summons would have to be suppressed, 
even in the face of an overwhelmingly civil 
purpose of the investigation as a whole. 
!£. at 150 
While the court in Genser II cites no authority for the 
conclusion that the evidence must be suppressed and gives no 
standards for when suppression is mandated, these issues were 
addressed at length in United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292 
(3d Cir. 1978) (Genser I) . In Genser I, the court indicated 
that, under LaSalle National Bank, in order for a summons to 
be validly issued it must first be issued before the Service 
recommends to the Department of Justice that a criminal prosecution 
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be undertaken and second, the Service at all times must use 
the summons authority in good faith pursuit of the congressionally 
authorized purposes of Section 7602 — not in an attempt to 
garner evidence in furtherance of a solely criminal investigation. 
The party opposing the summons bears the burden of disproving 
the existence of a valid civil tax determination or collection 
purpose on the part of the I.R.S. The Genser I court also indicated 
that the purpose of making the suppression remedy available 
to taxpayers was to ensure governmental compliance with the 
requirements of Section 7602. Thus, the holding in Genser II 
is limited to those cases where a governmental agency has: (1) 
acted in bad faith, and (2) abused a statutory right, and where 
(3) suppression would ensure compliance with the statutory provision 
in the future. 
Assuming, as defendants contend, that the present case 
is governed by the same standards as violations of Section 7602, 
there has been no showing in this case that the State acted 
in bad faith, or that suppression of the evidence would ensure 
governmental compliance in the future. Thus, the defendants 
have failed to meet their burden of proof with respect to whether 
the evidence obtained under the Subpoena Powers Act ought to 
be suppressed even under the standard advanced by them. Furthermore, 
it is questionable whether the Section 7602 standards should 
be applied in the present case since in Genser I the court clearly 
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indicated that these standards were specifically created to 
deal with a- particular type of governmental violation of the 
Internal Revenue Code. 
The appropriate standard for suppression of the evidence 
acquired under the "Subpoena Powers Act" in this case requires 
that the defendants show, as the State contends, a "substantial 
violation" of the defendants" constitutional rights and that 
the violation was "not committed in good faith," as required 
by Rule 12(g), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (Section 77-35-1-
2(g)). Defendants have neither acknowledged this Rule, nor 
attempted to meet the required showing for suppression of evidence. 
The United States Supreme Court in Segura v. United States, 
82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984); United States v. Leon, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 
(1984); and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 82 L.Ed.2d (1984), discusses 
the history and reasoning behind the Fourth Amendment and its 
vital protections and recognizes that suppression is not auto-
matically and blindly imposed each time there is an irregularity 
in the manner in which evidence is gathered. A ruling that 
the use of the "Subpoena Powers Act" in this case was unconstitu-
tional does not automatically mandate suppression of the evidence 
obtained thereunder. Defendants must also establish a substantial 
violation of their constitutional rights, as well as evidence 
that the actions taken by the prosecution were not taken in 
good faith reliance upon the validity of the statute. 
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The Court is particularly persuaded by the following language 
in Leon, supra; 
* * * 
We have not required suppression of the 
fruits of a search incident to an arrest 
made in good faith reliance on a substantive 
criminal statute that subsequently is declared 
unconstitutional. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 
443 U.S. 31, 61 L.Ed.2d 343, 99 S.Ct. 2627 
(1979) . . . 
Leon, supra, makes reference to Michigan v. DeFillippo, 
433 U.S. 31, 61 L.Ed.2d 343, 99 S.Ct. 2627 (1979), where the 
court held that a finding that a criminal statute is unconstitutional 
does not require suppression of the fruits of an arrest made 
in good faith reliance on the statute. 
These cases stand for the principle that suppression of 
evidence is not automatic. The DeFillippo case demonstrates 
that a search made in good faith reliance on a statute subsequently 
declared unconstitutional does not require suppression. 
Based upon the foregoing reasoning, the defendants1 Motion 
to Suppress is denied as they have not shown: (1) that the State's 
conduct in its use of the "Subpoena powers Act" in this case 
resulted in a substantial violation of the defendants1 constitutional 
rights, and (2) that the acts of the State were not committed 
in good faith reliance on what it assumed was a constitutional 
criminal statute. 
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If the defendants believe the facts conform to the above-cited 
standard, then the matter should be set for an evidentiary hearing 
in order that defendants may attempt to meet their burden. 
Dated this 15th day of January, 1985. 
&LJ2L 
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DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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